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Private equity entities and conglomerates: 
What are the differences?* 
 




We compare the characteristics of conglomerates and private equity entities. This is done by 
examining the differences among their business models. We analyze the relations of the two 
entity types to their investors on the one hand and to their investments on the other hand. The 
distinguishing characteristic of private equity entities is that they pursue a stand-alone-
perspective with their investment policies, meaning that they treat each investment 
separately. Therefore, various linkages that exist in conglomerates do not occur in private 
equity entities. We describe these linkages in detail. We further argue that because of the lack 
of these linkages in private equity entities the shareholders and debtholders of a private 
equity entity and its portfolio companies are not faced with the following risks that are 
specific for a conglomerate: the asset shifting risk, the intra-group profit risk and the capital 
structure risk. Finally, we define crucial evaluation criteria for identifying a private equity 
entity and develop a way how regulators and other persons concerned with such a task could 
do so.   
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Executive Summary 
 
At first glance, the structure of a private equity entity is very similar to that of a conglomerate. 
Therefore, equal treatment of both types by legislation or regulators seems to be conclusive. 
However, this approach fails to account for the significant differences between conglomerates 
and private equity entities. Due to the differences we conclude that regulation for 
conglomerates cannot be successfully transferred one-to-one to private equity entities. In this 
paper we analyze the differences. If legislators or regulators grant necessary exceptions to 
private equity entities the indisputable identification of the latter becomes a crucial issue. We 
therefore show a way to identify private equity entities in practice. 
 
Conglomerates and private equity entities have a different business model. Conglomerates 
invest for strategic reasons with a focus on current income. They integrate the new company 
and initially plan to hold it for an unlimited period of time. Private equity entities in 
comparison invest for a limited period of time with solely financial interests. Their investment 
policies follow a stand-alone-perspective, treating each investment separately from the rest of 
their portfolios. Private equity entities keep the focus on the capital gain when exiting the 
investment. The current income of the investment is only of secondary importance (chapter 
3). 
 
The criteria conglomerates apply to select their investments vary with their strategic 
alignment. Generally speaking, a conglomerate’s management deliberately chooses the 
companies it invests in. In contrast managers of private equity entities have to comply with a 
tight framework that limits the scope of their investments. Often private equity houses decide 
to make joint investments. If a portfolio company has need for additional funding and the 
private equity entity could not or would not enlarge its equity stake, it may decide to bring in 
additional investors. As a result the number of equity holders in a company is likely to 
increase over time, which may lead to a fragmentation of ownership.  In contrast a 
conglomerate is unlikely to involve other investors and thus ownership usually is less diluted 
(chapter 4). 
 
Conglomerates regularly have internal capital markets. Their financial resources are centrally 
planned and allocated; cash or liquidity is centrally managed and controlled. Private equity  
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entities in contrast do not have an internal capital market. There are neither mutual 
participations, meaning that no portfolio company invests in another portfolio company, nor is 
free cash flow allocated group-wide. There is no shared liquidity planning across the portfolio 
companies (chapter 5.1). 
 
One of the key characteristics of a financial holding as one form of conglomerate is the 
regular exercise of raising and controlling capital resources centrally by using financial 
planning and controlling systems. A private equity entity does not centrally raise and control 
all capital resources or manage cash centrally. It rather provides its portfolio companies with 
capital at a specific point of time with the clear intention to be rewarded by a capital gain 
within a certain period of time. Financial holdings invest with an unlimited time horizon. 
Therefore, they focus mainly on current income. 
 
There are multiple transactions going on between members of a conglomerate. Unless they 
are a financial holding, conglomerates show varied horizontal and vertical goods and services 
linkages. The conditions (i.e. the price) of these transactions are not always transparent for  
outsiders. Up to a certain degree they can be influenced by the conglomerate’s management. 
In private equity entities goods and services linkages are rare. If any transactions happen they 
are done at market prices (chapter 5.2). 
 
Corporate venturers can have both, a strategic and/or a financial focus. Whether they are more 
comparable to a financial oriented private equity entity or to a strategic oriented conglomerate 
depends on what interests its capital provider, the industry company, follows. Often an 
industry company, that is financing the corporate venturers, wants to have a so-called window 
on technology. If the corporate venturer claims the same treatment as the private equity entity, 
it has to satisfactorily proof its pure financial interests (Chapter 5.3).  
 
In comparison, the business model of a networked incubator has great similarities with the 
one of a conglomerate. Networked incubators invest long-term in a company. They do not 
have the intention to sell their shares in the short- or medium-term but engage in long-term 
investments for strategic reasons. Exiting the investment completely can have negative effects 
on the entire company because the preferred access to resources, which is critical for the 
success of networked incubators, may be affected. Regardless of the fact, that the ownership  
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interests of the networked incubators get diluted over time, the portfolio companies stay in 
close economic relation (chapter 5.4). 
 
Private equity entities usually are active investors. Depending on their strategic orientation, 
they more or less actively exercise influence on their portfolio companies. However, they do 
not intervene, compared to an operational holding, in the day-to-day business. They rather 
influence the normative and strategic management. They pursue, in contrast to the strategic 
holding, no superior group objective. Their influence aims at supporting solely the value 
creation of their portfolio companies. This is in line with the goal of the financial holding, 
neglecting its central financial planning characteristic. Private equity entities refrain from 
doing so (chapter 6.1). 
 
By using incentive and control systems both conglomerates and private equity entities enforce 
their interests. The financial incentives of private equity entities are structured in a way that 
the entrepreneur as well as the private equity entity are encouraged to increase the value of the 
portfolio company. In contrast to conglomerates, the compensation of the portfolio company’s 
management is never bound to the success of the entire private equity entity. Even with 
minority stakes the private equity entity could have the right to influence the portfolio 
company’s course of business. Through the set-up of the financial contracts the rights are 
bound to the performance of the portfolio company. The enforcement of control is therefore 
not used to pursue strategic interests, but to minimize the risks and to increase the value of 
every single investment. This stands in contrast to the common relevance of control at a 
conglomerate (chapter 6.2). 
 
As a result of the economic dependence, shareholders and debtholders of conglomerates are 
faced with specific risks. These risks are the asset shifting risk, the intra-group profit risks and 
the capital structure risk. The shareholders and the debtholders of private equity entities are 
not exposed to these risks due to the stand-alone perspective of their portfolio companies. The 
preparation of consolidated financial statements, which are meant to inform the bearers of 
these risks, is therefore not necessary for private equity entities (chapter 7). 
 
To define a private equity entity different criteria have to be met. A private equity entity has 
to have: no strategic interest in the investees, an exit strategy for each investment and multiple  
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investments. Other criteria only indicate if an entity is a private equity entity. The more of 
them apply the higher is the probability, that the entity is a private equity entity. These criteria 
are: the number of investors in the entity, the level of ownership interest in investees, the type 
of its investors, the existence of any centralized management, the degree of involvement in 
the day-to-day management of its investees, the existence of an internal capital market or any 
centralized cash management and the design of the management compensation system. The 






1) Obligatory criteria to define an entity as a private equity entity 
No strategic interests An exit strategy Multiple 
in investees! for each investee! investments!
2) Complementary criteria that indicate that an entity is a private equity entity
• Number of investors* in the entity  high low
• Level of ownership interest in investees low high
• Type of investors* passive active
• Centralised management for investees no yes
• Involvement in day-to-day management no yes
• Internal capital markets (including financing no yes
guarantees or borrowing arrangments) 
• Cash management within the group no yes
• Investees management compensation depending  depending
only on on the
investees‘ results entity‘s results
Probability of being a private equity entity high low
++
* i.e. limited partners
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1  Objectives of the Study 
Between private equity entities
1 and conglomerates many parallels can be drawn. A 
conglomerate is typically formed when a company invests into another company through an 
acquisition or when it starts up a new company by itself. Characteristic for a conglomerate is 
that it consists of two or more separate legal entities which are economically not independent 
from each other as they are controlled by the same parent company. Similar to conglomerates, 
it is also the business of private equity entities to invest in other companies. They buy up 
companies in a wide range of industries and thereby construct large company empires. Private 
equity managers usually provide advisory support to their so-called portfolio companies and 
therefore - similar to a conglomerate management - claim that they are able to improve the 
companies they invest in through superior management. The dimension of the provided 
management support does not only depend on the economic development of the portfolio 
companies but also on the strategic orientation of the private equity house.
2 
 
Though there are similarities, private equity entities and conglomerates differ in many ways. 
In this paper, we elaborate these differences in detail. The reason for doing the research has 
been an issue in accounting practice: Whether private equity portfolio company investments 
that are subsidiaries of private equity entities should be consolidated or instead be measured at 
fair value in group accounts had been controversially discussed over the last years. Although 
industry associations, especially the European Venture Capital & Private Equity Association 
heavily intervened and brought forward their arguments against this regulation, the IASB as 
the standard setter for the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has not yet 
changed its position.
3 Basically, two different lines of argumentation can be identified. The 
IASB focuses on the ability to control whereas the private equity industry points out the needs 
of its specific business model.   
 
 
                                                 
1   The technical term is venture capital companies and private equity companies (VC/PE companies). For the 
purpose of this paper we do mean as well private equity as venture capital when we speak of private equity.  
2   In the context of this paper we speak of a private equity entity when we do refer to both the investment 
company (or private equity company or private equity house) and its investees (portfolio companies). 
3   See EVCA (2002), pp. 1 et seq;  EVCA (2003d); Anonymous author (2003), p. 410; Becker (2004), p. 46. 
For the position of the IASB see IASB (2002), pp. 8 et seq.   
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Conglomerates require a different accounting treatment than economically independent 
companies. Certain information of the separate financial statements loses its expressiveness in 
the context of a conglomerate. This can only be compensated through additional regulation, 
i.e. the obligation to provide consolidated financial statements. As, at first glance, the 
structure of a private equity entity is very similar to that of a conglomerate an equal treatment 
of both types seems to be conclusive. Consolidated financial statements would then be 
obligatory.
4 However, this approach fails to account for the significant differences between 
conglomerates and private equity entities. The obligation for solely financially oriented 
investment companies to consolidate their balance sheets generates information which is 
useless in the best case but misleading in the worst case.
5 
 
The quality of the debate may benefit from a better understanding of how private equity 
entities and conglomerates differ.
6 The first objective of this paper is therefore to elaborate the 
differences between conglomerates and private equity entities. We examine the differences 
among the two business models; then, we analyze the relations of the two entity types to their 
investors on the one hand and to their investments on the other hand.
7 If legislators or 
regulators decide to grant necessary exceptions to private equity entities the indisputable 
identification of those becomes a crucial issue. This identification is easy in the case of 
regulated private equity entities
8 and will be indirectly done by the existing legal 
requirements.
9 But the majority of private equity entities is designed beyond legally regulated 
                                                 
4   This opinion is for example put forward by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In the 
revision of IAS 27 (Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements) published in December 2003 private 
equity entities are given the same status as conglomerates. In case of a parent-subsidiary relationship, the 
controlling entity has to prepare consolidated financial statements. According to IAS 27.19 this is explicitly 
also applicable for private equity entities. 
5   Cf. Mueller (2008), p. 166 et seq. These facts are also exemplary shown by a case study of the European 
Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA). Cf. EVCA (2003c). 
6   For the comparison of both organizational forms see also Baker/Montgomery (1994), Jensen (1989); 
Cheffins/Armour (2007), pp. 22 et seq. 
7   This corresponds to the approach of the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP): The 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) has published a Statement of Position (SOP 
Exposure Draft dated 17 December 2002), the aim of which is to define an investment company. It states 
that an applicable definition was the pre-requisite that investment companies could be exempted from the 
regulation of the recently enacted FIN 46. Their accounting will then be regulated by the AICPA Audit and 
Accounting Guide Audits of Investment Companies.  
8   In Germany e.g. those of the Unternehmensbeteiligungsgesellschaft and Kapitalanlagegesellschaft.  
9    In the proposed Statement of Position of AICPA (cf. fn 2) it is also suggested that already regulated 
investment companies do not have to furnish any additional proof for their investment activity.   
 
  Conglomerates and Private Equity Entities: What are the differences? 10 
structures. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and define criteria by which conglomerates 
and private equity entities can be clearly differentiated. The compilation of a checklist, which 
summarizes the most important criteria, will be another objective of the following study. 
 
The study is structured as follows: The following second chapter thoroughly defines the terms 
conglomerate and private equity entity. Then, in chapter three the different business models of 
the two will be worked out. This will result in significant differences with respect to the 
investment decisions, an aspect which will be described in more detail in chapter four. 
Chapter five will pursue the question, what types of linkages exist within conglomerates and 
within private equity entities. Chapter six analyses the influence, which conglomerates and 
private equity entities exercise on their investments before chapter seven discusses the 
resulting risks for shareholders and debtholders. Finally, chapter eight compiles criteria for a 
checklist by which private equity entities can be clearly identified. 
 
2  Definition of Terms 
2.1  Conglomerates 
Economically, a conglomerate
10 is the pooling of two or more legally independent companies 
under a common management. The parent exercises control over the subsidiary which usually 
results from a majority interest of a parent in a subsidiary company which causes the 
interpretation that both together form an economic entity. However, control can also be 
agreed upon by contractual agreements.
11 The management of the conglomerate is exercised 
by the parent company.  
 
Depending on the organization of the uniform management and its management 
characteristics, different types of conglomerates can be identified. In an operational holding, 
the conglomerate management is not a legally independent entity by itself but the 
management board of the dominating parent company. Apart from management, 
administration and financing of the subsidiaries the parent company carries out all important 
                                                 
10   In a narrow sense, a conglomerate is typically a large company that consists of seemingly unrelated business 
sections. However, we rather refer to it as a legal entity that consists of a parent and at least one subsidiary. 
Instead of conglomerates one could use the term corporate group, business group or simply group here.   
11   Cf. Scheffler (1992), p. 1.  
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functions to render goods and services, i.e. it is to a considerable extent operational active. 
The main purpose of the subsidiaries is to complement the production and distribution process 
of the parent company. 
 
If the conglomerate’s management entity does not carry out any operational tasks by itself and 
the day-to-day business remains in the hands of the subsidiaries two other types of 
conglomerates can be identified: the strategic holding and the financial holding. In the case of 
a strategic holding, the operational units are independent subsidiaries that enjoy a high degree 
of economic independence. The subsidiaries take responsibility for the day-to-day business. 
The strategic management of the whole conglomerate and, thus, also of the individual units, is 
part of the holding. The most vital strategic tasks include the allocation of funds, the decision 
to buy or sell subsidiaries, the management of the conglomerate’s research & development 
activities (R&D) and the selection and coaching of executives. As a result the strategic 
holding stands, as far as the competence areas are concerned, between the operational and the 
financial holding. 
 
The financial holding holds and manages majority and minority interests. However, it does 
not carry out any management tasks. The financial holding does not aim to exercise 
coordinated influence on its subsidiaries but to achieve an optimal return on investment. 
Linkages among the individual units are not actively prompted by the holding. The 
conglomerate’s management restricts itself to compose the portfolio of individual businesses 
and to effectively distribute the available funds among the portfolio companies. Therefore, the 
main characteristic of a financial holding is the central raising and controlling of both invested 
capital and liquidity. This is done by using financial planning and controlling systems.
 12 
 
If diversification aspects play an important role for the investment selection, the term 
conglomerate is used. This term refers to heterogeneous conglomerates with no linkages 
among the group-owned companies. The key idea of a conglomerate is to spread the risk by 
putting companies together that do their business in different, not related markets. Regarding 
this, conglomerates correspond in their structure and conduct to financial holdings. Therefore, 
we will not pursue an in-depth differentiation between the two. 
                                                 
12   Cf. Meichelbeck (1997), p. 96.   
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The decision to choose one of the three organizational forms (operational holding, strategic 
and financial holding) is subject to various considerations. In case of the operational holding 
and the strategic holding these are for example: 
•  organizational reasons (definition of management areas, flexibility), 
•  marketing or distribution reasons (development of new markets), 
•  procurement reasons (protection of markets for raw material supply), 
•  growth motives, 
•  the aim to realize synergies, 
•  financial reasons (admission of shareholders, liability reasons, support from a strong 
parent company) and 
•  political and legal considerations as well as fiscal reasons. 
A financial holding aims at capitalizing on the advantages of internal capital markets and the 
risk balance between investments. Occasionally, fiscal reasons may play a vital role. Theoreti-
cally, the aim is to compose and manage a balanced portfolio of investments. In practice, 
however, financial holdings are rather scarce in Continental Europe.
13 The few existing ones 
tend to be part of an operational or strategic holding and have the purpose to manage the 
financial investments. 
 
2.2  Private Equity Entity 
Private equity entities are professional intermediaries that invest capital provided by outside 
investors. Normally, they invest in privately owned companies, i.e. non-listed companies with 
a high growth potential.
14 The financed companies profit not only from the chance to raise 
capital at acceptable costs but also from the management support often provided by the 
private equity entity (the value added). The outside investors also benefit from the existence 
of these intermediaries: They get access to an asset class that is normally difficult to access. 
Hence, they can improve their asset allocation through the diversification of their investments. 
                                                 
13   Cf. Goold/Campbell/Alexander (1994), p. 416. 
14   Cf. Achleitner (2002a), p. 143 with regard to the sources of the value growth.  
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Depending on the development stage of the companies in which a private equity entity 
invests, one can differentiate between venture capital and buyout companies. Venture capital 
companies primarily invest in newly founded companies in the seed, start-up or expansion 
phase. Buyout companies invest in more established companies in later development stages. 
 
The term organizational structure of private equity entities refers to the institutional aspects of 
the relation between investors and private equity entities. Because of the broad universe of 
different types of private equity entities and the multitude of corresponding national legal 
regulations, we will only elaborate on those criteria which are important with regard to the 
organizational structure of private equity entities in practice:  
•  influence of the investors on the investment policy 
•  type of dominating investor 
•  type of financial instrument held by the investors 
•  limitation of the volume and life of the investment fund 
•  compensation of the management team 
 
A private equity entity basically consists of two parts: a management company and one or 
more investment funds.
16 The management company is responsible for the selection, control 
and support of the portfolio companies whereas the investment fund’s function is restricted to 
the holding of the various portfolio companies.
17 This institutional separation between 
management company and investment fund is industry standard for private equity entities. 
However, sporadic exceptions can be found in practice. 
 
Basically, it is attempted to structure a private equity entity in a way that double taxation in 
the form of income and capital gains tax is avoided; on the investment fund as well as on the 
personal level.  Illustration 1 shows the generic structure of a private equity entity. 
                                                 
15   Brav/Gompers (1997), p. 1800 show that companies financed by venture capital realize an excess yield 
compared to companies not financed by venture capital. 
16   Cf. Fenn/Liang/Prowse (1995). 
17   Cf. Zehmke (1995)p. 114.  
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Illustration 1: Generic structure of a private equity entity 
Differentiating private equity entities on the basis of how investors influence the investment 
policy of the fund, one can principally speak of independent and dependent private equity 
entities.
18 An independent company receives capital through the market mechanism, i.e. 
demand and supply, from a large number of investors.
19  Each investor only holds a small part 
of the capital and therefore cannot directly influence the investment policy.
20 The dependent 
company, in comparison, has capital available due to the hierarchical decision process of the 
investor which often also holds shares of the management company. As a consequence, he 
usually can strongly influence the investment policy of the private equity entity.
21 
 
If one differentiates the dependent private equity entities by the type of the dominating 
investor one can differ between the so-called captives and corporate venture capital compa-
                                                 
18   In practice however, there also is a multitude of hybrid forms. Cf. in this context i.a. Röper (2003), pp. 43 et 
seq. 
19   Typical investors in private equity entities are corporate pension funds, public pension funds, endowments 
and foundations, bank holding companies; wealthy families and individuals, insurance companies, invest-
ment banks; non-financial corporations; private equity holdings of major investor groups. Cf. 
Fenn/Liang/Prowse (1995). 
20   Within a limited partnership this is not only related to the small share but also by the fact that limited 
partners do not want to be exposed to liabilities. 
21   Cf. Zehmke (1995), p. 123.  
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nies. The captives are exclusively financed by financial service companies, such as banks or 
insurance companies, and, hence, pursue financial goals.
22 In contrast, corporate venture 
capital companies are financed by non-financial service companies, i.e. industrial companies. 
Besides financial goals industrial companies mostly also pursue strategic goals with their 
investments.
23 Examples for such goals are the access to new technologies (window on 
technology), the access to new products and the access to potential takeover candidates.
24 
 
Another distinction of private equity entities can be made by the type of financial instruments 
the investor uses. One can differ between financial instruments traded on public or private 
capital markets. This ultimately results from the legal form of the investment fund as it will be 
illustrated using the typical legal forms which exist under German law: the Gesellschaft mit 
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH, limited liability corporation), the Aktiengesellschaft (AG, 
stock corporation) and the Kommanditgesellschaft (KG, limited partnership). In case of listed 
financial instruments, which document the claims to the cash flows generated by investment 
funds, investors have the advantage of being able to liquidate their claims at any time. 
Examples of this are the legally grounded Investment Trust in Great Britain and publicly listed 
investment stock corporations in Germany. Privately held financial instruments, however, are 
illiquid. 
 
If one differentiates investment funds by limitations of the fund volume and the term of the 
fund, one can distinguish closed-end funds from open-end funds. In case of closed-end funds 
the volume of the fund is fixed and the subscription takes place during a certain period of 
time.
25 After the subscription period normally no additional investors can enter. The life of a 
closed-end fund is normally limited to ten years. Often however, an option to extent the life 
for up to three years exists.
26 The open-end fund in contrast is not fixed in its volume. The 
investors can invest into the fund at any time and the term of the open-end fund is unlimited. 
The private equity entity of a listed stock corporation represents a hybrid form. New capital 
                                                 
22   Cf. with regard to the following statements van Osnabrugge/Robinson (2001), p. 25 f. 
23   Cf. Working Council for Chief Financial Officers (2000). 
24   Cf. Working Council for Chief Financial Officers (2000). 
25   Cf. with regard to the following statements Zehmke (1995), p. 25 f. 
26   Cf. Achleitner (2001), p. 519.  
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from investors can only be raised after a resolution of the general meeting by way of a capital 
increase. The term of the fund is nevertheless unlimited. 
 
The management compensation of the management team of a private equity entity is often 
divided into an annual fixed payment (management fee) and a single success related bonus 
(carried interest). The management fee usually ranges from 2.0% to 2.5% p.a. of the fund 
volume managed.
27 This arrangement, however, is not true for all private equity entities. 
Listed private equity entities can for example receive their compensation from the funds 
provided by the shareholders. The carried interest from typical investment funds in Europe is 
almost always 20% of the realized fund return.
28 Nevertheless, one should note that this 
compensation scheme cannot be found in every organizational form of private equity entities. 




The limited partnership is one organization form of investment funds often found in practice. 
The management company, in form of a limited corporation or stock corporation, functions as 
a general partner meanwhile the investors only act as limited partners (LP). The owners and 
the management of the management company are called general partners (GP). Along with 
the limited partners they also invest in the fund and hold a small limited partner’s interest in 
the investment fund (typically about 1% of the fund volume).  
 
The analysis in the second chapter revealed that private equity entities show several parallels 
to conglomerates. However, by focusing on the way both types do their business the 
differences become evident. 
 
3  Business Model 
A business model describes the way by which a company does business and how returns are 
generated. The business models of conglomerates and private equity entities are 
                                                 
27   Cf. Feinendegen/Schmidt/Wahrenburg (2003), p. 1176. 
28   Cf. Feinendegen/Schmidt/Wahrenburg (2003), p. 1176. 
29   Cf. EVCA (2003a), p. 14.  
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fundamentally different. Firstly, they differ in the aspect how they add value through the 
holding of subsidiaries or portfolio companies respectively. Secondly - and as a consequence - 
the type and intensity of the relation among the associated companies is different. Finally, the 
role of the conglomerate’s parent company and the management company is different.  
 
A conglomerate, with exception of the financial holding, pursues a superior strategic goal 
with its investment policy. This long-term strategy dominates the entire group and affects the 
way the business portfolio is built: either by internal (organic) or external growth 
(acquisitions). All portfolio companies have to promote the global strategy and will be built 
up, developed or acquired according to the long-term perspective of the group. A 
conglomerate does not invest in a company to sell it again in the short- or medium-term. Each 
investment is rather done with the objective to be a permanent asset of the group. This results 
from the strategic aim of the group to generate synergies in its operative businesses. As the 
investment period is indefinite, the conglomerate focuses on current income that is distributed 
by the investment in order to be rewarded for the investment.    
 
Therefore, a conglomerate is more than the sum of its single companies. A whole network of 
group internal relations and synergies is part of it, i.e. by division of labour, specialization and 
the economies of scale.
30 The associated companies form an economic unit. This view is 
supported by the fact that various transactions among the legally independent companies of 
the group are conducted. As a consequence, the splitting off a single unit usually has an effect 
on the entire conglomerate.
31 
 
This perspective of the business model of conglomerates also reflects the valuation practice of 
financial analysts. They analyse the company value of groups or parts of them on a going 
concern basis. The question of a possible company value on a sum-of-the parts basis, i.e. as if 
the single parts were sold separately, is normally only brought up when analysts think that the 
conglomerate should be broken up. Only in these cases the market values of the constituents 
of a conglomerate are assessed separately. For the management of a conglomerate, however, 
                                                 
30   Cf. Scheffler (1992), p. 1. A financial holding finally differs due to the lack of a higher strategic goal. 
However, the financial interests are in line and aim at a permanent creation of value and at a distribution of 
the current income.   
31    These facts are more closely dealt with in chapter 5.  
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market values of the subsidiaries are only relevant in two cases. In case of a hostile take-over 
attempt, the management might use the market value to influence the initial take-over-bid. In 
other cases a conglomerate might decide on its own to either split off a subsidiary or to 
liquidate the whole group. In all cases strategic considerations play a dominant role. No 
conglomerate would communicate the assumed market values of its subsidiaries without an 
actual reason. 
 
In comparison to a conglomerate, a private equity entity follows no strategic interests with its 
investments.
32 The strategic interest of a private equity entity is to generate yields from 
exercising value adding influence on its various portfolio companies. The private equity 
entities therefore only have financial interests in their investments and focus on the current 
value of the portfolio companies. 
 
A private equity house invests, independently of its focus, only temporarily in a portfolio 
company. It provides capital to the acquired portfolio company to finance for example a 
growth strategy or a restructuring with the aim of generating additional value at the end of the 
day. It can be argued that private equity entities can only create additional value through the 
investing in companies in a certain development stage. Selling the investment is therefore part 
of the strategy of a private equity entity. The market value or more precisely the capital gain 
from the investments therefore is where the value added for a private equity house comes 
from. 
 
Selling the investment is necessary for the commonly structured private equity entities since 
the capital invested in the fund is only available for a limited period of time. However, exit-
orientation is also normal for other investment structures like the evergreen funds or listed 
private equity entities. Those have less pressure to exit in a pre-defined time period. 
Nevertheless, the exit is still regularly planned and if it does not occur within a reasonable 
period of time the primary intention is not met. The exit-strategy is already set forth in the 
financing contracts at the point of time when the investment is made.
33 However, it cannot be 
determined which exit channel will ultimately be used: either a going public, a trade sale, 
                                                 
32   For the special case of corporate venturers see chapter 5.3. 
33   Cf. Levin (2002), p. 102.  
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more rarely a buy back or a secondary sale to a further financial investor. In all cases the 
planned exit is an integral part of the investment idea; the process is something that both the 
entrepreneur and the private equity house have to agree on.
34  
 
This business model of a private equity entity is also reflected in the way financial analysts 
value these companies. When analysing listed private equity entities they value the price of 
the single investments on an exit value basis. This approach is fundamentally different from 
the way conglomerates are valued. These differences in valuation practices prove again that 
from the institutional investor’s point of view, different standards are applied to 
conglomerates and private equity entities. 
 
To sum up, conglomerates and private equity entities have a different business model. 
Conglomerates invest for strategic reasons with a focus on current income. They integrate the 
new company and initially plan to hold it for an unlimited period of time. Private equity 
entities in comparison invest for a limited period of time with solely financial interests. Their 
investment policies follow a stand-alone-perspective, treating each investment separately 
from the rest of their portfolios. Private equity entities keep the focus on the capital gain when 
exiting the investment. The current income of the investment is only of secondary importance. 
 
4  Investment Selection 
Depending on the different business model of conglomerates and private equity entities, the 
selection of subsidiaries or respectively portfolio companies is based on different decision 
parameters.  
 
Within conglomerates the selection of subsidiaries is decided by the holding company. It 
takes its decision on the basis of strategic considerations. The maximum acquisition price the 
holding is willing to pay depends on the fit of its new investment with the requirements of the 
group. Illustration 3 visualizes this using an example from the pharmaceutical sector. 
 
                                                 
34   The guidelines of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) explicitly recommend to agree upon 
the exit strategy with other investors and management prior to the investment. Cf. EVCA (2003b).   
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Illustration 3: Example of different strategies and resulting valuations (source: Goldman 
Sachs. Cf. Achleitner, A.-K. (2002b)) 
The need to bring the new company in line with the strategic objectives of the conglomerate 
often results in a high ownership interest up to one hundred percent. The ownership stake 
remains fixed unless an outsider wants to sell shares. A capital increase of the subsidiaries 
that results in a dilution of the conglomerate’s share will only take place out of strategic 
interest. Furthermore, it could happen if the strategic interest of the involved parent company 
has changed. Financial interests in the sense of capital increases only play a role in case of 
equity carve-outs or subsidiary IPOs. In the first case, public investors can invest a minority 
stake which is offered via a public share offering. In the latter a majority stake is offered. In 
both cases a rising degree of independency of the subsidiary from the conglomerate usually 
precedes the divestment decision.
 35  
 
The investee companies are selected according to financial factors only in case of financial 
holdings. Here, risk and yield considerations play a major role. Moreover, a high ownership 
interest is not a crucial condition. Consequently, both majority and minority stakes are 
common.  
 
                                                 
35   Cf. Achleitner/Wahl (2003).  
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The conglomerate’s management is autonomous in its investment policy; a formal agreement 
about the investment policy between the parent company and its investors does not exist. 
Material decisions, however, could require the approval of the advisory board or the 
shareholders. This right of the investors depends on national legislation and/or on contractual 
agreements. It is an instrument to control but does not intend to influence management’s 
decisions, i.e. which company it should buy, beforehand.  
 
Private equity entities that act upon financial motives have to keep an eye on the yield and 
risk characteristics of their investments. Additionally, the anticipation of possible exit 
strategies, which heavily depend on the development of the capital markets, is of major 
importance. The risk and yield considerations not only come into play for each single 
investment object but also much more into a portfolio context. The fund’s management could 
be tempted to excessively increase the investment risk in order to raise the expected returns. A 
risk increase favors the management because it only holds a very small share of the fund and 
therefore only has to bear proportionally small losses. However, it substantially participates 
from the additional chances if one takes the typical carried interest of around 20% of net 
returns into account.
36 Of course, this argument does not take into account that a 
management’s good reputation is necessary to raise a follow-on fund and that the 
management’s small share of the fund is relatively important to its private wealth. 
Nevertheless, investment principles limit the management’s scope of action to guarantee a 
certain degree of risk diversification for the other investors. Furthermore the management is 
bound to select investments under qualitative and quantitative criteria.
37 These investment 
principles are an integral part of the contractual agreements between the investors and the 
management company upon the launch of a new fund. 
 
Diversification according to life cycle stages, industries or geographic location belongs to the 
qualifying criteria.
38 The main idea of diversification is that the correlation between 
companies of different sectors is smaller than the correlation of companies of the same sector. 
In spite of the existing diversification potential, a number of private equity houses target only 
                                                 
36   Cf. Möller (2003), p. 217. 
37    Cf. in this regard the study by Gompers/Lerner (1996) for the American and 
Feinendegen/Schmidt/Wahrenburg (2003) for the European venture capital market.  
38   Cf. Bigus (2003), p. 445.  
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very specific companies for example within one industry. They hope that the disadvantages of 
a limited diversification are more than offset by the advantages of specialization (e.g. lower 
transaction costs as costs). Furthermore, through years of experience in one industry sector 
expertise can be built up. Thus, the search and selection of investments becomes easier and 
the loss risks can be assessed more accurately.
39 
 
In their investment policies private equity entities limit their commitment to a single portfolio 
company to a certain maximum share, e.g. 10% of the investment volume, right in the 
beginning; irrespective of whether they have a specialized investment approach or not. 
Furthermore the number of investments per fund is restricted to a maximum of for example 
10-20 portfolio companies. A maximum limit is based on the consideration that the 
management is only capable of handling a limited number of investments. Otherwise, the 
investors of a private equity entity aim for a minimum number of portfolio companies to 
secure sufficient diversification. 
 
Conflicts of interest can arise if a manager is responsible for several funds. The industry 
associations formulate recommendations in their guidelines to handle such conflicts of 
interests.
40 For example they state that such conflicts should be reported to the investors or 
that portfolio companies are not allowed to receive capital from more than a single fund 
managed by the same private equity house. 
Finally, the investment guidelines very often limit the scope of the fund managers. They 
include type of investments that may not be entered into, e.g. investments in other private 
equity entities, investments in listed instruments, leverage buyouts or possibly foreign 
investments.
41 This is in clear contrast to conglomerates. 
 
Due to these selection principles of private equity entities, the purchase price for an 
investment can only be determined by applying a stand-alone perspective to the valuation. 
Without the linkages among invested companies or the existence of synergies, the shown 
                                                 
39   Cf. Bigus (2003), p. 445. 
40   Cf. in this connection e.g. the guidelines of EVCA (2003b).  
41   Cf. Gompers/Lerner (2004).  
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considerations in case of the pharmaceutical companies become useless.
42 The few cases 
where a private equity entity acquires an investment with the prospect to merge it with 
another portfolio company constitute an exception to this. However, these incidences are 
either individual cases or can be attributed to the few private equity entities which 
expressively pursue so-called buy-and-build strategies. The latter are ultimately interested in 
establishing sector holdings. 
 
In contrast to conglomerates, private equity entities do not regularly see one hundred per cent 
stakes in their investments as necessary. The substantial participation of the portfolio 
company’s management may already be a guarantor for value creation potential in the 
portfolio company. As a consequence, it is necessary for private equity entities to 
contractually design, when acquiring the investment, the conditions regarding the exit 
decision. A conglomerate does not have to do that.   
 
Apart from the limits regarding the initial investment in a company, other limits concerning 
the participation in subsequent capital increases can be found. In the case of venture capital 
financing the existence of several financing rounds is industry standard, i.e. the capital supply 
is staggered (so-called staging). On the one hand this staging effectively limits investment 
risks. Via staging, the private equity house can re-evaluate the information on the portfolio 
company and the market setting, but also the behaviour of the entrepreneur prior to a new 
financing round. On the other hand stage financing motivates the entrepreneur to deliver good 
results by indirectly threatening that the portfolio company might not get further financing 
otherwise. This procedure also makes sense from the view of the portfolio company: In case 
of good performance, the valuation of the company will be adjusted and the conditions for 
raising capital will improve.  
 
The conditions for future financing rounds normally will be tied to the achievement of certain 
monetary and non-monetary targets. Depending on the achievement of these certain targets, 
the private equity house’s share of its portfolio company changes. Due to the high uncertainty 
during the early life stages of the portfolio company the ownership interest of the venture 
                                                 
42   Cf. Achleitner/Wahl (2003), p. 133.  
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capital company usually tends to be higher in the beginning than in later stages.
43 In contrast 
to a conglomerate, the ownership interest of a private equity house in its portfolio company 
varies over time depending on the success of that investment. 
 
The involvement of other investors in the portfolio companies may also be based on financial 
motives. Sometimes only a joint investment enables the realization of a specific transaction as 
private equity entities may have constraints on how much how money they can invest in a 
single company. Syndication may also increase the deal-flow. Other relevant advantages of 
the syndication of equity financings are both reputation transfer for the portfolio companies 
and an increase in exit options through a proliferated network.
44 This is in contrast to a 
conglomerate where only strategic considerations dominate and joint investments rarely 
happen.   
 
Private equity entities hold both, majority and minority stakes. But as discussed above, with 
subsequent financing rounds the size of the stakes usually diminishes. If two or more 
investors jointly invest in a company an alignment of their interests is essential. This might be 
a serious problem for strategically motivated investors. Private equity entities, however, easily 
achieve an agreement with other financially motivated investors over important issues as the 
contract regarding a future exit of the investment.  
 
To summarizes, the criteria conglomerates apply to select their investments vary with their 
strategic alignment. Generally speaking, a conglomerate’s management deliberately chooses 
the companies it invests in. In contrast managers of private equity entities have to comply 
with a tight framework that limits the scope of their investments. Often private equity houses 
decide to make joint investments. If a portfolio company has need for additional funding and 
the private equity entity could not or would not enlarge its equity stake, it may decide to bring 
in additional investors.  As a result the number of equity holders in a company is likely to 
increase over time, which may lead to a fragmentation of ownership. In contrast 
conglomerates are unlikely to involve other investors and thus ownership usually is less 
diluted. 
                                                 
43 Cf. Kaplan/Strömberg (2003).   
44 Cf. Lerner (1994), p. 416.   
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5  Intra-Group Linkages 
As a result of the different business models of conglomerates and private equity entities the 
relationships among the individual associated companies deviate. The implementation of 
strategic goals of a conglomerate can only be realized when intra-group linkages are actively 
promoted. This has to happen on the one hand between the holding and the subsidiaries, and 
on the other hand between the subsidiaries themselves. However, as will be shown, these 
linkages create new forms of risks within a conglomerate.  
 
Principally, two basic types of linkages can be differentiated: Linkages between subsidiaries 
may be called horizontal linkages. They exist at the operational holding as well as at the 
strategic holding, but not at the financial holding. The linkages between a holding and its 
subsidiaries are called vertical linkages. These have to be further differentiated according to 
the holding’s management function, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
Fundamentally, capital linkages in form of equity or borrowed capital and operative linkages 
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Illustration 4: Horizontal and vertical linkages 
 
5.1  Capital Linkages 
The allocation of financial resources is the central coordination instrument of all 
conglomerates: the operational, strategic and financial holding. On the basis of a finance and 
investment strategy capital and liquidity is distributed from the parent company to the 
subsidiaries. Hence, the subsidiaries are in competition with each other.  
 
The so-called internal capital market is a typical attribute of a conglomerate. The subsidiaries 
are provided with equity capital. Cash flows from the subsidiaries can then be used to finance 
other businesses of the conglomerate which might possess a more promising growth potential. 
Financing using the internal capital market is principally preferred to external financing. 
Firstly, managers of a conglomerate are supposed to possess superior knowledge about the 
prospects of the different companies than external investors and, secondly, the transaction 
costs of a subsidiary IPO can be avoided. However, the capital market rarely honours this 
theoretically supposed benefit by higher share prices.
45 One possible explanation for this 
might be that internal capital markets do not function like real markets; they rather operate 
                                                 
45   According to a study, the average valuation markdown of a conglomerate on the capital market 
(conglomerate discount) as compared to the individual valuation of the group companies amounts to 12 to 
15%. Cf. Berger/Ofek (1995).     
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like a mixture of central planning and company internal negotiations. Moreover, political 
decisions on the holding level might bias a fair competition among the subsidiaries. 
 
External financing means funds provided to a company by third parties. Through the use of an 
internal capital market the conglomerate has, compared to individual companies, the 
possibility of an intra-group external financing. This means that each single company has 
access to capital from any of the conglomerate’s companies. In addition to any external 
financing partner outside of the group (i.e. banks), all the conglomerate’s companies are 
potential financing partners. This mentioned intra-group external financing can be equity as 
well as debt financing (inter-company loans).
46 
 
Additionally, cash management is an important short-term financial control instrument in a 
conglomerate. This should safeguard liquidity and increase profitability. A group wide cash 
management can be divided into the group clearing, where mutual receivables and liabilities 
of the group companies are balanced, and the cash pooling. The latter coordinates the short-
term liquidity excesses and shortages of each single subsidiary in a central place. Thus, the 
liquidity excess of one subsidiary is withdrawn centrally and made available to another 
subsidiary.  
 
A private equity entity neither has an internal capital market nor a central cash management. 
The private equity house invests with equity capital in the portfolio companies.
47 There are 
usually no financial links between the individual portfolio companies. The individual 
portfolio companies finance themselves through loans or additional external equity.
48 
 
                                                 
46     Cf. Theisen (2000), p. 460. 
47   European venture capital financiers use classic equity in less than 60% of all cases, but also other mezzanine 
forms, such as preferential shares (25%), convertible bonds (10%) or classic debt (5%). Cf. Bottazzi/Da 
Rin/Hellmann (2004), p. 17. 
48   KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS & CO., one of the best-known US private equity entities, pointedly formulates 
this as follows: "KKR operates as an investment firm, not as a conglomerate or a holding company. Each 
company in our portfolio is independently managed and financed. Each has its own board of directors, 
which includes KKR representatives. There are no cross-holdings. Cash flow from one company cannot be 
used in another company." Cf. in this context the internet pages of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.: 
www.kkr.com (15/12/2003).  
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The investors of private equity entities commonly prevent the development of internal capital 
markets. Many contracts stipulate that proceeds from disinvestment of a portfolio company as 
well as returns from probable profit distribution have to be returned to the investors and 
cannot be reinvested.
49 This is especially true for term limited funds.  
 
Most agreements with investors constitute, that the private equity entities are not allowed to 
raise additional debt capital on the fund level.
50 Otherwise, the management of private equity 
entities might be induced to excessively increase the risk for the investors because of the 
agency problems outlined in chapter 4. This regulation is not applicable for conglomerates. 
The stand-alone treatment of each portfolio company in a private equity entity also ensures 
that one portfolio company does not bail for or serves as collateral for credits of another 
portfolio companies. This is common practise in conglomerates. 
 
It can be summarized that conglomerates regularly have internal capital markets. Their 
financial resources are centrally planned and allocate; cash or liquidity is centrally managed 
and controlled. Private equity entities in contrast do not have an internal capital market. There 
are neither mutual participations, meaning that no portfolio company invests in another 
portfolio company, nor is free cash flow allocated group-wide. There is no shared liquidity 
planning across the portfolio companies. 
 
5.2  Goods and Services Linkages 
The operational and strategic holdings are characterized by internal goods and services links. 
At operational holdings these links exist between the parent company and the subsidiaries. 
Strategic holdings only have links among their subsidiaries due to the lack of operational 
activity by the management company. The financial holding by definition totally lacks goods 
and services linkages, and if they happen, they are not centrally organized. 
 
                                                 
49   Gompers, P./Lerner, J. (1996) for example confirm that this clause was contained in more than 35% of the 
contracts between investors and private equity entities examined by them in the USA in the period of time 
from 1988-92. Feinendegen/Schmidt/Wahrenburg (2003) show that this clause can be found also in about 
30% of the European contracts examined by them. Moreover, our discussion partners have confirmed this. 
50   This is true for over 90% of US and over 65% of European partnership agreements. Cf. Gompers, P./Lerner, 
J. (1996) and Feinendegen, S./Schmidt, D./Wahrenburg, M (2003).   
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Examples for goods and services linkages are the supply of goods, semi-finished goods and 
manufactured goods, the rendering of services, the transfer and sale of fixed assets, patents, 
licences, coordination and control services and even joint research & development activities.
51 
 
If a transaction between the subsidiaries of a conglomerate takes places, fictitious - fiscally 
reasonable - transfer prices are to be assessed. These transfer prices must bear up against the 
dealing at arm’s length principle whereby one has to distinguish between effective and 
hypothetical dealings. Often, no comparable transactions exist for the goods and services 
linkages of subsidiaries. Therefore, standard methods based on the dealing at arm’s length 
principle have to be used. These include the methods of price comparison, re-sale and cost 
mark-up. In practice the standard cost mark-up and the price comparison method dominate. 
 
The transfer price policy of a conglomerate focuses on a possible reallocation of earnings 
from a financial and fiscal point of view. The transfer of earnings in low-tax countries is of 
special importance. However, numerous linkages among the subsidiaries and a central group 
policy have to exist in order to facilitate the shifting of earnings into another country. As a 
result operational and strategic holdings can optimize net profits via an adequate transfer price 
policy. Furthermore, the holding often uses the transfer prices to manage and to control its 
subsidiaries. 
 
Private equity entities express their merely financial interest in the individual portfolio 
companies and their independence through the fact that goods and services linkages are 
generally rare. There are no regular shared services like purchase, administration or legal 
advice rendered. An exception to this is the special form of so-called networked incubators.
52 
Horizontal goods and services linkages on the portfolio level are possible, but the turnover 
seldom reaches a significant dimension.  
 
If in individual cases portfolio companies render services to each other, the private equity 
entity only establishes the contact. The transactions among the involved portfolio companies 
will be negotiated without any influence of the private equity house. The price corresponds to 
                                                 
51   Cf. Meichelbeck (1997), p. 69. 
52   Cf. in this regard the statements made in part 5.4.  
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the market price for at least two reasons. Firstly, the management teams of the portfolio 
companies would not approve a disadvantageous transaction for the benefit of a higher profit 
for the entire group because they usually own substantial shares of their portfolio companies. 
Secondly, the private equity house would not enforce its control possibilites for reasons of 
reputation. The damage to its image, by acting against the interests of a portfolio company 
would be fatal and would make the search for new investments extremely difficult. 
 
As a consequence, the private equity entity’s exit from one of its investments does not affect 
the other portfolio companies due to the lack of these linkages. This is necessary because the 
private equity houses plan, as described previously, their exit when entering into an 
investment. The only possible linkages can be continued without any restrictions and at the 
same conditions after the divestment of the private equity house.  
 
There are multiple transactions going on between members of a conglomerate. Unless they 
are a financial holding, conglomerates show varied horizontal and vertical goods and services 
linkages. The conditions of these transactions are not always transparent for an outsider. Up to 
a certain degree they can be influenced by the conglomerate’s management. In private equity 
entities goods and services linkages are rare. If any transactions happen they are done at 
market prices. 
 
5.3  Special Case: Corporate Venturers 
The so-called corporate venture capital companies are a special type of private equity entities. 
They are often set up and/or funded by corporates with a strategic objective (window on 
technology). However, it has to be mentioned that not all private equity entities receiving 
capital from just one industrial company have to be automatically corporate venture capital 
companies. Decisive criterion is rather the underlying motive for the disposal of capital. In 
practice both can be found: Corporate venturers that invest with a strategic focus and others 
that invest solely with a financial focus. The latter act as far as the objective of this paper is 
concerned just like ordinary private equity entities. 
 
At corporate venture capital companies, goods and services linkages among portfolio 
companies occur more frequently due to the strategic proximity of the portfolio companies 
and their corporate investor. Whether these linkages are priced at arm’s length depends on the  
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holding’s influence on the portfolio company and the strategic orientation of the corporate 
venture capital company. 
 
Corporate venturers commonly invest in both majority as well as minority stakes. Their 
strategic interest to control the portfolio company is rarely alignable with the interests of other 
investors. Nevertheless, they do syndicate their investments in portfolio companies. The 
advantages of the syndication discussed before principally also apply. However, the 
coordination of interests becomes more difficult at later stages and, thus, the circle of possible 
partners is respectively smaller from the beginning.  
 
Corporate venturers can have both, a strategic and/or a financial focus. Whether they are more 
comparable to a financially oriented private equity entity or to a strategic oriented 
conglomerate depends on what interests its capital provider, the industry company,  follows. 
Often an industry company that is financing the corporate venturers wants to have a window 
on technology. If the corporate venturer claims the same treatment as the private equity entity, 
it has to satisfactorily prove its interest that is purely financial.   
 
 
5.4  Special Case: Networked Incubators 
In contrast to the stand-alone approach, the so-called networked incubators
53 pursue an 
approach to selectively promote the integration of their portfolio companies. Incubators in 
general provide new companies a shared infrastructure and a range of services and receive an 
equity stake in return. The mayor synergies will be generated for companies with identical or 
similar business areas.  
 
A networked incubator is characterized by an institutionalization of the networking. The type 
and manner of institutionalization varies. For example, an expert group can advise new 
companies or mediate new industry contacts. Through this institutionalization two essential 
advantages are achieved. On the one hand the dependence on contacts of individual managers 
is reduced. On the other hand a network is set up at an early stage even before serious 
problems arise. Moreover, portfolio companies can react fast if suddenly an opportunity 
                                                 
53   Cf. also with regard to the following paragraphs Hansen et al. (2000).  
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arises. Through extensive networking, portfolio companies also gain preferred access to 
resources that are critical to success. It might become easier to recruit qualified personnel, 
obtain expert advise or make new partnerships. However, it should be emphasized that 
portfolio companies are free to decide whether to use the offered contacts and services from 
the networked incubators or not. 
 
Foundations of such networks are the portfolio companies supplemented by selected strategic 
partners. Companies that have started in the networked incubator environment later often 
become strategic partners. To foster their participation, networked incubators often aim at 
keeping a substantial equity stake of the portfolio companies. 
 
The business model of networked incubators has great similarities with that of conglomerates. 
Networked incubators invest long-term in a company. They do not have the intention to sell 
their shares in the short- or medium-term but engage in long-term investments for strategic 
reasons. Exiting the investment completely can have negative effects on the entire company. 
The preferred access to resources, which is critical for the success of networked incubators, 
may be affected. Regardless of the fact that the ownership interests of networked incubators 
get diluted over time, the portfolio companies stay in close economic relationship. 
 
6  Influence on Investments 
In the following, the management of subsidiaries (in a conglomerate) and portfolio companies 
(in a private equity entity) will be compared. Different situations in which the parent company 
or the private equity house decides to make use of their control rights and determines 
management decisions are analyzed. Furthermore, instruments to enforce interests are 
described. 
 
6.1  Areas of Influence 
The degree of management influence of the conglomerate’s parent company depends on the 
organizational form of the group. The operational holding is intensively involved in the 
business of its subsidiaries. The management in the areas of marketing, production, R&D or 
personnel is centralized at the parent company for all subsidiaries. As a result, the subsidiaries 
depend on their parent company for their day-to-day operations. Subsidiaries from operational  
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holdings differ from dependent business departments only through their legal independence. 
The group management has to coordinate extensively the linkages between the units but also 
profits from its extensive influence by being able to effectively realize operational synergies. 
 
The strategic holding separates operative and strategic tasks. The group management is not 
operationally active, compared to the operational holding. The operational decision making 
remains at the responsibility of the subsidiaries. The parent company defines the company’s 
philosophy, business objective, strategic orientation and management style. This kind of 
management aims at achieving the overall business objectives through the concentration on 
core competencies. Furthermore, the strategic holding controls and monitors the subsidiaries 
and steps in when material decisions, i.e. the staffing of important management positions, are 
to be made.   
 
By definition, the financial holding restricts itself to monitoring its subsidiaries and to 
intervene in major decisions with importance for the group’s portfolio. It aims at compiling an 
optimal portfolio under risk and return aspects, within the available financial resources. The 
regular exercise of raising and controlling capital resources centrally by using financial 
planning and controlling systems is one key characteristic of financial holdings.
54 
 
The last point effectively underlines the difference between a financial holding and a private 
equity entity. A private equity entity does not centrally raise and control all capital resources 
or manage cash centrally. It rather provides its portfolio companies with capital at a specific 
point in time with the clear intention to be rewarded by a capital gain within a certain period 
of time. Financial holdings invest with an unlimited time horizon. Therefore, they focus 
mainly on current income. 
 
Private equity entities do not pursue an overall strategic goal for their portfolio of companies. 
Instead, they focus only on the financial outcomes. However, they are not passive investors 
since they exercise management functions in individual areas. In these cases they act with 
regard to the success of the single investment, not with a group strategy in mind. The 
                                                 
54   Cf. Meichelbeck (1997), p. 96.  
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exercised influence is supposed to add value to the portfolio company that can later be 
skimmed off when exiting. 
 
A private equity house does not intervene in the day-to-day business of its portfolio 
companies. There are broadly three essential activities that generate additional value for the 
portfolio companies.
55 First, they help the portfolio companies to develop a strategic 
competitive position. Second, they help them with critical business decisions and serve as a 
discussion partner for the management. Finally, they provide their companies with access to 
the network of contacts and advisors. 
 
The selection and development of executives is a central task of operational, strategic and 
financial holdings. Private equity houses also support their portfolio companies when staffing 
management posts. Sometimes, rights to staff management positions are contractually 
granted, because the success of the investment mainly depends on its top management. In 
contrast to a group, personnel transfers among portfolio companies are not actively promoted. 
This is a common practice of conglomerate management to reduce the coordination 
requirements between the subsidiaries. This is done to link the parent company and its 
subsidiaries through an intensive know-how transfer. Through this values and company 
culture are transferred and promoted throughout the conglomerate. On the contrary, private 
equity entities do not strive for this integration and coordination among their portfolio 
companies.  
 
In order to effectively advice and control, the private equity house has to be comprehensively 
informed on the economic situation. Private equity entities are therefore granted special 
information rights in the financing contracts. Alongside the right to receive regular reports, 
this also includes rights of visits.
56 
 
To sum up, private equity entities usually are active investors. Depending on their strategic 
orientation, they more or less actively exercise influence on their portfolio companies. 
However, they do not intervene compared to an operational holding in the day-to-day 
                                                 
55   Cf. Sapienza/Manigart/Vermeir (1996).  
56    Cf. Heitzer (2002), p. 473.  
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business. They rather influence the strategic management. They pursue, in contrast to the 
strategic holding, no superior group objective. Their influence aims at supporting solely the 
value creation of their portfolio companies. This is in line with the goal of the financial 
holding, however, the latter still exercise central financial planning functions. 
 
6.2  Instruments of Influence 
The influence of the parent company on the subsidiaries and/or of the private equity entity on 
portfolio companies is instrumentalized by a well-structured incentive system on the one hand 
and control possibilities on the other hand. The respective differences will be discussed in the 
following.  
 
The principal-agent theory states that incentive problems arise between a conglomerate’s 
parent and its subsidiaries, and between a private equity entity and its portfolio companies 
respectively. The parent company as well as the private equity entity (principals) charge the 
management of the subsidiaries or portfolio companies (agents) with carrying out the 
business. However, it is not granted that the agents act in the interest of the principals. There-
fore, different incentive systems can be established to bring these diverging interests in line. 
 
Both the operational and the strategic holding take majority stakes out of strategic interests. 
Often they hold one hundred percent of their investments. The management of a 
conglomerate’s subsidiary normally does not hold significant ownership stakes in its 
company. The compensation of the subsidiary’s management should contain variable parts in 
order to create incentives which are in line with the conglomerate’s overall interests. Listed 
conglomerates can for example issue stock options on shares of the conglomerate. As a result 
the manager has not only an interest in the performance of his subsidiary but also in the 
conglomerate’s overall performance. Moreover, performance-related components of the 
compensation can be linked to key performance indicators such as profit or turnover.
57 If the 
entire conglomerate follows a value-based management approach, a more optimal indicator 
for example would be the economic value added (EVA).
58 In addition, conglomerates often 
                                                 
57   Cf. Myers (1999), p. 137. 
58   With regard to value-based conglomerate management cf. Stewart/Stern (1991).  
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reward efforts aimed at improving the whole group performance with non-monetary 
incentives, e.g. a better reputation or the prospect of a promotion.
59  
 
Private equity entities on the contrary do not intend to actively manage their portfolio 
companies. They invest in companies with a management in place or team up with managers 
to carry out a management buy-in/ buy-out (MBI/MBO). In the case of venture capital 
financing, the management always holds a direct share in the company. But also in cases of 
company buy-outs or restructurings, the management and/or entrepreneur regularly holds a 
significant stake in the company. The private equity entity must invest alongside a 
management team because it does not intervene in the day-to-day business.
60 Through the 
management’s significant ownership stake the interests of the private equity entity are 
matched with the interests of the entrepreneur.  
 
The main interest of private equity entities is to increase the value of their investments. This 
view is also supported by the fluctuation of the share they own in their portfolio companies. 
In contrast, the ownership interest of a conglomerate in its subsidiary usually stays constant. 
In private equity entities the share of the portfolio company which is owned by the 
entrepreneur and the private equity house respectively serves as an incentive system to 
achieve common goals. In the financing contracts milestones are agreed upon which 
determine certain allocation of ownership shares at the different financing stages. A US study 
proved that the equity share of the private equity entity is on average smaller in case of good 
performance and larger in case of bad performance.
61 To guarantee maximum proceeds from 
the divestment of a portfolio company, management can also participate in the capital gain. In 
this case a bonus on the basis of the proceeds from the investment is agreed upon. 
 
Besides the incentive structure, the possibilities to control the subsidiaries and the portfolio 
companies are to be analysed. The possibility to enforce interests in the investments depends 
for both conglomerates and private equity entities on whether a majority or a minority stake is 
held. If a majority stake is held, interests can be enforced fairly easy. That is not the case if a 
                                                 
59   Cf. Sahlman (1990), p. 416. 
60   Cf. Kaplan/Strömberg (2003). 
61   This may for example be realized by way of stock options which the entrepreneur may exercise upon 
accomplishment of the milestones.   
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minority stake is held. Therefore, operational and strategic holdings will not enter into 
minority stakes if strategic group targets are involved. Financial holdings and private equity 
entities, in contrast, also enter into minority stakes because of their purely financial interest.
62 
Because of the high uncertainty regarding the investment and the information asymmetry 
between the entrepreneur and the private equity entity special participation and decision rights 
are usually granted to the private equity entities. As a consequence, the risk for private equity 
entities can be decreased.  
 
Investment contracts are as a matter of principle incomplete contracts. Not every detail in the 
relation between private equity houses and portfolio companies can be negotiated beforehand. 
To overcome this problem, private equity houses often exercise influence through 
representatives on the boards of their portfolio companies. The distribution of the seats on the 
board can deviate from the actual ownership interest. Private equity houses may have a higher 
number of board seats, than they would be entitled to due their ownership stake.
63  
 
Furthermore, both parties agree upon a negotiated list of transactions subject to authorization 
of the private equity entity (veto rights). These are transactions of crucial importance for the 
private equity entity, e.g. the budget plan, the distribution of the earnings, major investments, 
M&As, strategy changes or the staffing of top positions. 
 
The possibility to dismiss or replace the management of the portfolio company, even without 
having the required capital or vote majority, is a vital instrument for the private equity entity 
to enforce its own interest. Under these circumstances the entrepreneur has a permanent 
incentive to increase the value of his company.
64 The private equity house can dismiss the 
management in case of misjudgement, without having to exit its investment. The entrepreneur 
signals confidence in his own abilities by approving such a clause in the financing contracts. 
                                                 
62   Apart from this, it has to be observed in case of a minority stake whether the other shareholders of the 
participation have a financial or strategic orientation. In case of reconciliation with other financial investors, 
a private equity group can expect identical interests, potential conflicts are rather unlikely. 
63   Cf. Möller (2003), p. 30. Kaplan/Strömberg (2003) show that venture capital companies proportionally have 
more voting rights than ownership interests.  
64   In case of dismissal from the management team, he would lose the non-monetary benefits connected with 
the performance of this office. Moreover, he might also have to bear a financial loss. In particular in the US-
American VC practice, the financing contracts often contain regulations on the purchase of the shares by the 
VC - in most cases at a price below the market value of the company. Cf. Sahlman (1990) p. 508.  
 
  Conglomerates and Private Equity Entities: What are the differences? 38 
By using incentive and control systems both conglomerates and private equity entities enforce 
their interests. The financial incentives of private equity entities are structured in a way that 
the entrepreneur as well as the private equity entity are encouraged to increase the value of the 
portfolio company. In contrast to conglomerates, the compensation of the portfolio company’s 
management is never bound to the success of the entire private equity entity. Even with 
minority stakes the private equity entity could have the right to influence the portfolio 
company’s course of business. Through the set-up of the financial contracts the rights are 
bound to the performance of the portfolio company. The enforcement of control is therefore 
not used to pursue strategic interests, but to minimize the risks and to increase the value of 
every single investment. This stands in contrast to the common relevance of control at a 
conglomerate. 
 
7  Risks through Dependence 
A conglomerate’s management can enforce the strategic interest of the conglomerate as a 
whole or of individual companies in the group since the individual subsidiaries are in 
economic dependence on the conglomerate’s  management. As a consequence, the 
shareholders and debtholders of the individual subsidiaries are exposed to additional risks that 
do not occur at economically independent companies. These risks are: 
 
•  the risk of capital shifting 
•  the risk of intra-group profit 
•  the capital structure risk 
 
Starting point of the following idea is that a company A controls a company B. The economic 
dependence between A and B can be exploited. Company A can draw capital resources to the 
disadvantage of company B.
65 This can be called the risk of capital shifting. Company A 
could for example easily use patents or process knowledge of B without any compensation. 
Furthermore, it is possible that due to the controlling position of company A, assets are traded 
between the companies at prices that are not market-oriented. The granting of credits or the 
signing of consulting or license contracts to conditions that are not market based will probably 
                                                 
65   Cf. Meichelbeck (1987), p. 978.   
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shift assets. The privileged placing of orders to company A by company B is also possible.
66 
The shareholders of A as well as B are confronted with the risk that the net worth of their 
respective companies is reduced. The debtholders of these companies are confronted with the 
risk that assets serving as collateral for credits are undermined.
67  
 
The intra-group profit risk is another form of risk which only affects the shareholders and the 
debtholders of economically dependent companies. The companies A and B could supply or 
render goods and services to each other. The parent company A could for example sell 
products to its subsidiary B that is only responsible for the distribution of these goods. When 
looking at the individual companies, the returns from these transactions are taken into 
account.  A’s turnover would and its return could increase. But if both companies are 
considered as an economic unity these returns are not realized by way of an external party 
transaction, even when market prices have been assessed.
68 For shareholders of the purchasing 
company the problem might arise that their company purchases intra-group goods and 
services that cannot fully be used or sold. Indirectly it affects the value of the parent 
company’s investment in the subsidiary but this is difficult to measure. The debtholders of 
both companies are exposed to this additional risk: the intra-group profits could be distributed 
to the shareholders and thereby could reduce the assets serving as collateral. Parent company 
A in our example could increase its dividends to its shareholders because of the returns out of 
the transaction with its subsidiary B. But if B fails to sell the goods to the market, its losses 
will affect the value of A’s investment. Hence, A might be unable to pay back its debt. 
 
The lack of economic independence can further result in a higher capital structure risk or a 
credit loss risk for the debtholders of company A. The fund supplied to company A by the 
debtholders of A could be used to increase the equity of company B. This happens when 
company A for example provides funds to company B in order to increase the capital stock. 
The funds could be used by company B to finance an investment. If B now increases its debt 
and a bankruptcy occurs, the debtholders of company B might be paid off in priority to the 
debtholders of company A.  
                                                 
66   Cf. Meichelbeck (1999), p. 15.  
67   However, this risk can often be excluded upon pressure by the creditors by way of a liability association 
between A and B.  
68    Cf. Meichelbeck (1999), p. 16.   
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All these shown risks do not apply to private equity entities. In chapter 5 it was discussed that 
no internal capital market exists within a private equity entity. As a consequence, the capital 
structure risk does not apply: If there are no credit relations on the fund level no risks can be 
transferred to debtholders. Finally, there is no mutual granting of credits among the individual 
portfolio companies. 
 
It was further shown, that goods and services linkages only occur sporadically. This stands in 
contrast to operational and strategic holdings. Private equity houses do not influence their 
portfolio companies to carry out intra-group transactions. As a result there are no asset 
shifting or intra-group profit risks. In contrast to a conglomerate, transactions between 
portfolio companies are based on negotiations between the individual companies. Hence, 
transactions are carried out at market prices. 
 
The considerations that have been shown above may lead to the use of different accounting 
methods of conglomerates and private equity entities. The accounting has to adequately 
reflect the financial relationship between a company and its environment in order to provide 
interested people with valuable information.
69 This essential information can normally be 
found in the annual financial statements.  
 
Separate financial statements provide insights into the economic situation of the individual 
company. The separate financial statements of the individual subsidiaries of a conglomerate 
cannot provide, due to the shown risks, the needed information. The more intense the goods 
and services linkages are, the higher is the risk that the information provided in the separate 
financial statements is misleading. With the preparation of consolidated financial statements 
the imperfections of separated financial statements should be overcome. The consolidation of 
capital, debt, revenue and expense eliminates the conglomerate’s internal linkages. The 
preparation of consolidated financial statements, therefore, makes economic sense for 
operational, strategic and financial holdings.  
 
                                                 
69   Cf. Busse von Colbe et al. (2003), p. 20.  
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For private equity entities however, this consolidation is not needed due to the lack of group 
internal linkages. Solely for corporate venture capital companies, pursuing a strategic interest, 
and for the networked incubators, promoting group internal linkages, consolidated financial 
statements could be justified to meet the information function of accounting statements. 
Consolidated financial statements of private equity entities do not carry out this function. 
 
To sum up, as a result of the economic dependence, shareholders and debtholders of 
conglomerates are faced with specific risks. These risks are the asset shifting risk, the intra-
group profit risks and the capital structure risk. The shareholders and the debtholders of 
private equity entities are not exposed to these risks due to the stand-alone perspective of their 
portfolio companies. The preparation of consolidated financial statements, which are meant to 
inform the bearers of these risks, is therefore not necessary for private equity entities. 
 
8  Criteria to Define a Private Equity Entity 
Based on the above-mentioned considerations, the following criteria can be used to 
differentiate a private equity entity from a conglomerate.
70 This distinction may become 
important whenever private equity entities are subject to separate legal or regulatory 
obligations or exemptions.  
 
In order to identify an entity as either a private equity entity or a conglomerate two sets of 
criteria have to be checked. The first set contains mandatory criteria an entity must comply 
with in order to qualify as a private equity entity. The second set contains criteria that should 
be considered but are not necessary to classify an entity as a private equity entity. Illustration 
5 provides an overview of the following discussion.  
                                                 
70   The following argumentation is in general based on the way which is also suggested in the “exposure draft 
of the AICPA to clarify the scope of the Audit and Account Guide Audits of Investment Companies in the 
US (cf. FN 4)”.  
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1) Obligatory criteria to define an entity as a private equity entity 
No strategic interests An exit strategy Multiple 
in investees! for each investee! investments!
2) Complementary criteria that indicate that an entity is a private equity entity
• Number of investors* in the entity  high low
• Level of ownership interest in investees low high
• Type of investors* passive active
• Centralised management for investees no yes
• Involvement in day-to-day management no yes
• Internal capital markets (including financing no yes
guarantees or borrowing arrangments) 
• Cash management within the group no yes
• Investees management compensation depending  depending
only on on the
investees‘ results entity‘s results
Probability of being a private equity entity high low
++
* i.e. limited partners
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Illustration 5: Example of a checklist to identify private equity entities 
 
The first obligatory criterion results from the business model described in chapter 3. The 
professed and pursued aim of a private equity entity is to invest in companies out of financial 
interests, i.e. exclusively in order to realize capital gains or current income. A private equity 
house has no strategic interest in the companies it invests in. A strategic interest would exist if 
an investment in a company would be held with the objective to achieve other then purely 
financial benefits that are not available for third, unrelated parties. Others than purely 
financial benefits could be obtained through any transaction between the entity and the 
investee: e.g. the acquisition of intangible assets, the use of processes or technology that 
belong to the investee or agreements to cooperate in developing, producing or distribution of 
products and services. All transactions must have in common that they are generally not 
available to other parties or that they are not based on fair value terms. Within a private equity 
entity transactions between participating companies rarely occur. As shown in previous 
chapters, the individual portfolio companies are not linked to each other but are managed as 
stand-alone companies.   
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In most cases private equity entities pursue their financial interest by realizing a capital gain 
when exiting their investments. They rarely obtain current income. This entails that the 
investments usually will be sold again in the short- to medium-term (3 to 8 years). An exit 
strategy for their investments is therefore an integral part of the initial investment decision 
and is another obligatory criterion which any entity should fulfill in order to be classified as a 
private equity entity. The agreement to exit the investment is usually documented in the 
financing contracts between the private equity entities and their investees. 
 
In part 4 of this paper it was shown that private equity entities limit their risks through a 
diversification strategy. It was shown that most investment guidelines agreed upon between 
investors and private equity entities limit the investment of the fund’s resources in a single 
portfolio company. Therefore it is a necessary and obligatory criterion for a private equity 
entity to hold multiple investments and not only one or two.  
 
The two last mentioned criteria, the exit strategy and multiple investments can easily be 
verified. The third criterion, the absence of strategic interest, is much more difficult to prove. 
Therefore, a list of examples that constitute a non-financial interest could help.
71 One possible 
sign of a non-financial interest might be the fact that a significant portion of turnover results 
from transactions between portfolio companies.  
 
To finally prove that an entity is a private equity entity further criteria should be examined. 
However, they are not inevitable necessary to define a private equity entity but can give 
indications as to whether an entity is rather a conglomerate with strategic orientation or a 
financially oriented private equity entity. First of all, the number of investors in the private 
equity fund is important. Private equity houses act as intermediaries, i.e. they collect capital 
and invest it in other companies. The more significant the influence of an individual investor 
is in a fund, the higher is the possibility that this influence is used strategically.  
 
The level of ownership interest in the investees is another signal that an entity qualifies as a 
private equity entity. A conglomerate needs a high level of ownership in its subsidiaries to 
exercise control and being effectively able to follow its strategic interests. The less majority 
                                                 
71   In the exposure draft of the AICPA to clarify the scope of the Audit and Account Guide Audits of Investment 
Companies in the US (cf. FN 4) such a list of examples is shown (§ 1.8).  
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holdings an entity has, the more likely is the existence of a private equity entity. If one has a 
look at this criterion, it is useful to distinguish between venture capital and later stage 
investments. Buyouts are characterized by majority ownership stakes. A private equity entity 
that focuses on buyouts, has therefore more of them.  
 
If an investor not only provides funds but also runs the day-to-day management of the entity 
or decides about the investment strategy of the entity, he is called an active investor. Passive 
investors do not determine the business of the entity. If rather active types of investors in the 
fund dominate, their engagement could be out of strategic motives. Therefore, it is likely that 
the entity is not a private equity entity. But this must not be necessarily the case: corporate 
venture capital for example could also be invested for financial reasons. 
 
Another criterion to test is the existence of centralised management for investees. If the entity 
carries out any service functions for their portfolio companies, such as shared administration 
services, shared legal advice or similar, it is an indication that the entity is less likely to be a 
private equity entity. This corresponds with the entity’s involvement in the day-to-day 
management of the portfolio companies. The more often this happens the higher is the 
probability of a strategic interest.  
 
Furthermore, in a private equity entity an internal capital market including financing 
guarantees or borrowing arrangements does not exist. This was discussed in chapter 5. It was 
also shown that cash management within a group is not the case for a private equity entity.  
 
The last criterion is the investee’s management compensation. If it also depends on the 
investing entity’s results, then this is a signal that strategic goals are pursued with the 
investment.  
 
A checklist of criteria compiled with the present objective to identify a private equity entity 
will always contain criteria which only give an indication but do not constitute a clear proof 
of a merely financial interest. Similar to many questions of this type, it will also in this case 
(i.e. the determination whether a unit in question is a private equity entity or not) an answer 
can only be found by weighing the various criteria. 
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9  Summary 
This study describes the fundamental differences between a conglomerate and a private equity 
entity. Private equity entities are financially oriented investors. They invest for a limited 
period of time in a company. The exit is regularly planned and contractually agreed upon 
when entering into an investment. Conglomerates, with the financial holding as an exception, 
are strategic investors. They pursue an overall group objective when investing in a subsidiary. 
This results in capital as well as goods and services linkages among the group’s companies.  
 
These linkages do not exist between the companies of a private equity entity. This results in 
the fact that the arising risks for the shareholders and debtholders of a group’s company do 
not occur at private equity entities. From this it can be concluded, that the preparation of the 
consolidated balance sheet for example, is not necessary for private equity entities.  
 
It is possible to identify private equity entities. However, this will not be possible when 
looking at one characteristic alone. In order to define a private equity entity different criteria 
have to be met. A private equity entity has to have: no strategic interest in the investees, an 
exit strategy for each investment and multiple investments. Other criteria only indicate if an 
entity is a private equity entity. The more of them apply the higher is the probability, that the 
entity is a private equity entity. These criteria are: the number of investors in the entity (i.e. 
limited partners in the fund), the level of ownership interest in investees, the type of its 
investors (i.e. limited partners), the existence of any centralized management, the degree of 
involvement in the day-to-day management of its investees, the existence of an internal 
capital market or any centralized cash management and the design of the management 
compensation system.   
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